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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Daxx Diaz filed a Petition For Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR"), alleging Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel against his trial court attorney. Following an evidentiary hearing, the
district court dismissed Mr. Diaz' petition and entered judgment in favor of the state. Mr. Diaz
asserts one claim of error, that the district court committed reversible error by dismissing his
PCR case.

Statement of the Facts
Mr. Diaz was convicted at jury trial for Driving Under The Influence in Ada County case
CR-MD-2015-9083. (R., p. 6.) The district court sentenced Mr. Diaz to a unified sentence of
thirteen years, with five years determinate and eight years indeterminate. (Id.)
Following the denial of his direct appeal, Mr. Diaz filed a Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief, in which he alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel against his trial court attorney,
Ransom Bailey of the Ada County Public Defender's Office. (R., pp. 6-22.) Upon appointment
of counsel, once again the Ada County Public Defender's Office, an Amended Petition was filed.
(R., pp. 62-72.)
The district court dismissed seven of Mr. Diaz' eight PCR claims in summary fashion.
(R., 347-49.)

The case proceeded to evidentiary hearing on January 31, 2019. Both sides presented
witnesses. Mr. Diaz presented an affidavit from a forensic scientist and toxicologist, Kenn
Meneely. (Tr., p. 6, ls. 23-25; R., pp. 314-17). The district court ruled from the bench, denying
Mr. Diaz' petition. (Tr., p. 103, ls. 9-14).
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The district court issued its Order Dismissing Claim After Evidentiary Hearing on
February 7, 2019. (R., pp. 499-500.) The district court entered its Judgment on the same day.
(R., p 502.)
Mr. Freeland filed this appeal, claiming error by the district court in dismissing his PCR
Petition. (R., pp. 504-07.)

Course of Proceedings
Daxx Diaz filed his Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, and supporting affidavit and
materials, in the Ada County District Court on February 15, 2018. (R., pp. 6-20.)
The district court dismissed seven of Mr. Diaz' eight claims by way of summary
disposition. (R., pp. 347-49.)
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on January 31, 2019. The district court
denied Mr. Diaz' post-conviction petition. (R., pp. 499-500.) The district court entered judgment
against Mr. Diaz and in favor of the State ofldaho on February 7, 2019. (R., p. 502.)
Mr. Diaz filed his Notice of Appeal on February 25, 2019. (R., p. 504-07.)

Issue Presented on Appeal
1.

Whether the district court erred by dismissing Mr. Diaz' Petition For Post-

Conviction Relief?
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Argument

I.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Diaz' Petition For Post-Conviction Relief.

A. Standard of Review
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact.

Marr v. State, 163 Idaho 33, 37, 408 P.3d 31, 35 (2017); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). When faced with a mixed question of fact and
law, the Court will defer to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial
evidence, but will exercise free review over the application of the relevant law to those facts.

Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011).

B. Legal Standards For Post-Conviction Relief
An application for Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR") under Idaho Code § 19-4901 et seq.,
initiates a special proceeding, which is civil in nature, and is an entirely new proceeding, distinct
from the criminal action which led to the conviction. Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 536, 716
P.2d 1306, 1308 (1986); Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 27, 878 P.2d 198, 201 (Ct. App. 1994).
In a post-conviction proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish grounds for relief by
a preponderance of the evidence. Cosio-Nava v. State, 161 Idaho 44, 48, 383 P.3d 1214, 1218
(2016); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995); Reynolds,

supra; Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 626, 826 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Ct. App. 1992).
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under
both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13
of the Idaho Constitution. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought
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under the post-conviction procedure act. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272, 61 P.3d 626,
629 (Ct. App. 2002).
The landmark case on ineffective assistance of counsel claims is Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Strickland, the United
States Supreme Court first defined the right to counsel contained within the Sixth Amendment as
the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id., 466 U.S. at 686 (citing McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970)). Counsel can deprive a defendant of the right to
effective assistance of counsel simply by failing to render “adequate legal assistance.” Id. (citing
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). The purpose of
the right is, simply, to ensure a fair trial. Id. “The benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id.
The Strickland case established a two-prong test for analyzing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the Petitioner must
demonstrate (1) that trial counsel’s performance was “deficient”, and (2) that the Petitioner was
prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This standard has been
adopted by the Idaho appellate courts. See, e.g., Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561, 149 P.3d
833, 836 (2006).
To establish that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, the Petitioner must show that
the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). The proper
measure of attorney performance is “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The Petitioner must overcome a presumption that the attorney’s
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF -- 4

conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance and sound trial strategy.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561, 149 P.3d at 836.
Proving “prejudice” requires a showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Saykhamchone v.
State, 127 Idaho 319, 323, 900 P.2d 795, 799 (1995)(citing Strickland , supra.); Parrott v. State,
117 Idaho 272, 275, 787 P.2d 258, 261 (1990). A “reasonable probability” is defined as “a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;
Booth v. State, 151 Idaho at 618, 262 P.3d at 261 (citing McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570,
225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) and Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
“When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, ‘this Court does not
second-guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for postconviction relief, unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review.’” Marr, 163
Idaho at 37, 408 P.3d at 35 (citing State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 382-83, 247 P.3d 582,
609-10 (2010)).
The Strickland decision outlines specific duties that trial counsel must honor in
representing criminal defendants. Counsel must assist the defendant and owes the defendant a
duty of loyalty. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Counsel’s “overarching duty” to advocate the
defendant’s cause includes the duty to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to
keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course” of the case. Id. Counsel
has a duty to make “reasonable investigations” regarding the case. Id., 466 U.S. at 691. Counsel
has a duty to “bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial
testing process.” Id., 466 U.S. at 688.
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF -- 5
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The issue in Mr. Diaz’ case revolved around the testimony of two “experts”, Dr. Gary
Dawson and the Drug Recognition Evaluation (“DRE”) officer. This was required because Mr.
Diaz had provided a breath sample below the legal limit of .08. Dr. Dawson testified that upon
review of the DRE and the urinalysis testing, he determined that Mr. Diaz was impaired at the
time he was operating his motor vehicle. Mr. Diaz was convicted of DUI.
Mr. Diaz’s counsel attempted to defend Mr. Diaz by arguing that he did not appear very
intoxicated on video. (Tr., p. 21, ls. 5-15; p. 22, ls. 6-12, p. 23, ls. 10-14). Notably, however,
counsel failed to present any witnesses, testimony, or expert opinions to attack, discredit or
defend against the state’s expert witness. In fact, counsel testified that he did not even contact or
consult with a scientific expert in this case. (Tr., pp. 20, l. 22 – 21, l. 1; p. 22, l. 6 – p. 23, l. 7; p.
24, ls. 1-4; p. 28, ls. 11-23; p. 49, l. 23 – p. 50, l. 8).
Had counsel done so, an expert could have testified in contradiction of the state’s expert’s
findings regarding impairment. At the PCR evidentiary hearing, Mr. Diaz provided proof of
what testimony could have been offered in the form of an expert opinion from Kenn Meneely, a
forensic toxicologist with nearly forty years’ experience. Mr. Meneely stated under oath that a
number of the state’s expert’s opinions were incomplete or inaccurate from a scientific
standpoint, including stating matters to a degree of medical certainty, a number of misstatements
regarding the specific drugs in Mr. Diaz’ system and whether they would register in a drug test,
and significant misstatements on whether certain drugs would interact with alcohol such as to
impair a person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle. (See Affidavit of Ken Meneely, Evid. Hrg.
Exhibit A, pp. 2-3). Each of the items of evidence played a part in the jury convicting Mr. Diaz.
Refuting each of these items of evidence would have helped play a role in disputing the scientific
evidence which formed the core of the government’s case against Mr. Diaz.
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Here, the failure to adequately investigate the science of this case made it such that
counsel was not able to effectively cross examine Dr. Dawson or the DRE. As Mr. Meneely’s
affidavit pointed out, there were several material issues that counsel failed to examine or expose.
First, counsel failed to obtain the rolling log from the State through discovery. As Mr.
Meneely explained, this is a necessary tool to be used in evaluating the accuracy of the DRE’s
conclusions by contrasting the conclusions of the instant case with previous evaluations. (R., p.
315, para. 23.) Without this evidence, Mr. Bailey was unable to effectively cross examine, and
defend against, the DRE. Appellate counsel cannot identify any strategic advantage to exposing
inaccuracies or not impeaching a critical witness. Rather, this appears to be a simple failure to
investigate Mr. Diaz’ defenses based on a failure to investigate and prepare a defense.
Next, Mr. Meneley was able to review and analyze all evidence available to Dr. Dawson.
The preliminary report of the Pre-Sentence Investigator contained a statement that has been
deemed inappropriate and misleading. Because Mr. Bailey did not investigate or consult with an
expert, he was unaware of this statement’s unacceptance in the scientiﬁc community and missed
an opportunity on cross examination to expose this statement to the jury or engage in a
meaningful examination of Dr. Dawson as to why a credentialed expert witness would include a
bolstering statement in his scientiﬁc initial report. (See R., p. 315, paras. 25-28.)
Next, Mr. Meneely pointed out that if the fact that Mr. Diaz took his prescribed buspirone
was accurate, as relied on by Dr. Dawson, then buspirone would have been detected in the urine.
(R., p. 315, para. 29 – p. 316, para. 32.) According to Mr. Diaz’ post-conviction expert, since
buspirone was not present in Mr. Diaz’ urine, it should not have been relied upon as a potential
impairing substance.
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Had Mr. Bailey consulted with an expert in this case he would have been made aware of
this, and been prepared to cross examine Dr. Dawson on his experience in regards to current
urinalysis screening for buspirone. Further, if a toxicology expert familiar with urinalysis
screening for buspirone would have been called to testify at trial it is reasonably probable that the
jury would not have relied on the testimony of Dr. Dawson about the impairing effects of
buspirone and potentially acquitted Mr. Diaz on Count I of the information. (See R., 316, para.
32.)
Next, Dr. Dawson did not address THC in his initial report, but he testiﬁed at length at
trial about its effects. (See R., pp. 213-14, containing Trial Tr. pp. 323-27). Dawson opined that a
urine test would never show the active component of THC. (R., p. 220, containing Trial Tr., p.
350, ls. 7-11). Mr. Meneely contradicted and disputed this assertion. (R., p, 316, paras. 35-36.)
Had trial counsel been aware of this contradictory information, he would have been able to
impeach the state’s expert witness in regard to not only his familiarity with THC and urinalysis
testing, but urinalysis testing procedures as a whole. All of this evidence could have been
utilized to help procure an acquittal for Mr. Diaz.
Additionally, Mr. Meneely disputed Dawson’s analysis of whether buspirone and alcohol
impaired Mr. Diaz. (R., p. 316, paras. 37-42.) Speciﬁcally, Mr. Meneely asserted that Dawson
ignored the results from the DRE’s clinical evaluation, and believed those results to be critical
when analyzing cases such as Mr. Diaz’s. (R., p. 316, para. 42.) He further pointed out that the
American Prosecutor Research Institute takes a critical view of cases where the clinical ﬁndings
are absent in toxicology cases. (R., p. 316, para. 43.) Mr. Meneely indicated that had Mr. Diaz
been impaired, his pupils would have been dilated and he would have had an increased pulse
rate. Neither physiological factor was present in Mr. Diaz’s case. (R., p. 316, para. 41.)
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Had Mr. Bailey consulted with a toxicologist he would have been made aware of these
inconsistencies, and potentially had an opportunity to engage in a meaningful cross examination
of Dr. Dawson. Counsel failed to do so, and as a result was not prepared to address the specific
scientiﬁc testimony that lead to Mr. Diaz’s conviction.
In summary, Mr. Meneely was able to opine that had trial counsel provided the testimony
of a toxicologist at trial, a jury likely would have disagreed with Dawson and acquitted Mr. Diaz
of operating a motor vehicle while under the inﬂuence of alcohol and drugs. (See R., p. 316,
paras. 45-46.)
This evidence, or evidence of a similar nature from any forensic toxicologist or related
scientific expert, could have been produced at trial, had trial counsel adequately investigated and
prepared for Mr. Diaz’ defense, and therefore had been effective in his representation. Counsel
testified that he had the ability to do so without much effort or trouble. (Tr., p. 22, ls. 13-23).
This evidence, or similar expert testimony, would have radically altered the outcome of the
proceedings. (see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 694) by refuting the crucial evidence against Mr.
Diaz including the ultimate determination that Mr. Diaz was operating a motor vehicle while
impaired, resulting in the jury’s conviction for DUI.
The District Court disagreed, and denied Mr. Diaz’ PCR case, stating in summary that
this was only argument and not based on any evidence. (Tr., p. 101, ls. 24-25). The District
Court erred in this regard.
Mr. Diaz needed only prove his PCR allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, not
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thompson v. State, 164 Idaho 821, 825, 436 P.3d 642, 646 (2019).
Preponderance of the evidence is defined as that degree of proof which more probable or likely
than not. Black’s Law Dictionary 1182 (6th Ed. 1990).
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After Mr. Diaz’ presentation of evidence at the PCR trial, he clearly met this low
standard. He showed that had his counsel performed up to standards, he could have (1) rebutted
the state’s main argument, (2) provided expert testimony for the jury to consider, (3) undermined
the validity of the state’s expert’s testimony, and (4) provided an effective defense and, therein,
reasonable doubt for jury to acquit Mr. Diaz.
Inexplicably, his counsel took no such efforts. He made no effort to obtain an expert
witness and, shockingly, never even consulted with one to assist him in making that
determination.
Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations regarding his client’s case.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. This duty includes investigating potential defenses and supporting
witnesses. Counsel failed in this regard. The District Court put insufficient weight on this factor
in holding against Mr. Diaz at the PCR evidentiary hearing.
This Court should remedy that error, and vacate the Judgment against Mr. Diaz.
Mr. Diaz’ case is similar to Marr v. State, 163 Idaho 33, 408 P.3d 31 (2017). In Marr,
the district court granted post-conviction relief for the petitioner after his counsel failed to pursue
potential defenses for the petitioner’s jury trial. The State appealed the decision.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court determined that
Marr’s trial counsel failed to investigate evidence that would have supported a self-defense
argument at trial.
The Court held that ‘”[a] lawyer who fails adequately to investigate, and to introduce into
evidence, [evidence] that demonstrate[s] his client’s factual innocence or that raise[s] sufficient
doubt as to that question to undermine confidence in the verdict, renders deficient
performance.”’ Id. 163 Idaho at 39, 408 P.3d at 37 (quoting Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070
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(9th Cir. 1999)). Here, trial counsel admitted under oath that he did no investigation into the
issue of challenging the scientific testing results upon which the State relied to convict Mr. Diaz.
(Tr., pp. 20, l. 22 – 21, l. 1; p. 22, l. 6 – p. 23, l. 7; p. 24, ls. 1-4; p. 28, ls. 11-23; p. 49, l. 23 – p.
50, l. 8).
“While a tactical decision generally cannot be the basis for relief, a decision constitutes
deficient performance when the ‘decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review.’” Id. (citing
Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho 713, 717, 390 P.3d 439, 443 (2017))(additional citation omitted).
In this case, Mr. Diaz offered evidence at the evidentiary hearing that his trial counsel did not
provide adequate preparation and investigation into Mr. Diaz’ potential defenses, including
failing to present science-based evidence of innocence to the jury. Similar to Marr, Mr. Diaz’
trial counsel engaged in deficient performance which fell below objective standards of
reasonableness.
Turning to the issue of prejudice, although the district court only summarily addressed
the issue in its opinion, Mr. Diaz asserts that his counsel’s deficient performance severely
prejudiced him at trial. If Mr. Diaz’ counsel had called a toxicologist to testify at trial, Diaz’
claim would have been more credible, and it is very possible the jury would have acquitted Diaz
of the DUI charge. Thus there is a reasonable probability that the result of trial would have been
different. See Marr, 163 Idaho 39, 408 P.3d at 37. Again, the Marr decision mirrors the instant
case. Therefore, the second prong of Strickland requiring a showing of prejudice is satisfied. See
id.
Mr. Diaz provided sufficient evidence at his evidentiary hearing to support a showing of
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. The district court erred by finding that Mr.
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Diaz did not make a showing of deﬁcient performance, and ruled in contravention 0f the Idaho

Supreme Court’s holdings. This Court should remedy

this error.

Conclusion

Mr. Diaz’
defense.

was

the

He

trial

counsel failed t0

failed miserably in

main

any

make

reasonable efforts t0 investigate Mr. Diaz’ case and

efforts t0 refute the science presented

basis for Mr. Diaz’ conviction for

legal limit. Counsel’s deﬁcient

DUI

since he his

by the

state,

Which

BAC results were below the

performance deprived Mr. Diaz 0f the necessary evidence t0 gain

an acquittal and signiﬁcantly prejudiced him. Mr. Diaz was therefore deprived 0f a

fair

adversarial process. This Court should address this injustice. Mr. Diaz respectfully requests that

the Court vacate the district court’s

judgment against him, and remand with appropriate

instructions t0 grant judgment in his favor.

DATED this 4th day of September, 2019

Paul E. Riggins
Paul E. Riggins

Attorney for Appellant

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF --

13

Certiﬁcate of Service

Ihereby

certify that

on September

4th, 2019, I
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Idaho Attorney General
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Law Division

Box 83720

Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
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Paul E. Riggins

Attorney for Appellant
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